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ABSTRACT 
China’s rules and practices in relation to technology transfer have been of long-standing concern 
to its trading partners. These concerns are most strongly evident in the United States Trade 
Representative’s Section 301 Report which foreshadowed the imposition of substantial increased 
tariffs on Chinese goods; a move which was quickly mirrored by China. This article subjects some 
of these concerns to legal scrutiny. Particular attention is given to China’s treatment of grantback 
clauses in technology transfer contracts which speak to the ownership of improvements made to 
licensed technology. China’s outgoing and recently revised rules are evaluated under two 
questions. The first is whether China’s rules are discriminatory contrary to the TRIPS national 
treatment obligation. The second is the extent to which states are free under the TRIPS to interfere 
with freedom of contract in technology transfer. The article identifies a shift as between the two 
questions from high consensus, to low consensus norms. While the prohibition on discrimination 
must be strictly interpreted and applied, other TRIPS provisions which touch upon the control of 
anti-competitive practices in technology licensing, do not remotely reflect a stable international 
consensus. Interpretations of these provisions should therefore seek to accommodate different 
approaches, rather than presume that they reflect and prioritize one approach to the exclusion of 
others.  
[Keywords] technology transfer; technology licensing; grantback clauses; TRIPS; national treatment 
INTRODUCTION 
The regulation of technology transfer contracts is an enduring challenge, both at the level of domestic 
rules and the development of international principles. While it is generally accepted that these contracts 
cannot be left entirely to the commercial freedom of the parties involved, there is no settled consensus 
on the optimum content and extent of intervention. Regulation tends to reflect state preferences in 
relation to the balance between intellectual property protection and competition law, an assessment 
which is influenced by their economic positions as primarily producers and creators, or users, of 
intellectual property.  
Differences in regulatory approaches  can lead to tension between states and the pursuit of solutions via 
diplomatic channels, economic pressure and legal remedies. On the resort to law, the most relevant 
international instrument in force is the TRIPS agreement. Indeed, this article uses as its background 
case study the dispute settlement proceedings initiated by the US1 and EU2 in relation to China’s alleged 
interference with contractual freedom in technology licensing contracts.3 While nobody wins trade 
                                                          
* Hillary Rodham Clinton School of Law, Swansea University. The author can be contacted at 
a.p.davies@swan.ac.uk. 
1 WT/DS542 China – Certain Measures Concerning the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights. 
2 WT/DS549 China – Certain Measures on the Transfer of Technology. 
3 The subject area has already attracted academic scrutiny, albeit that there is little thematic overlap with the 
current contribution. See, Weihuan Zhou, Huiqin Jiang & Qingjiang Kong, ‘Technology Transfer under China’s 
Foreign Investment Regime: Does the WTO Provide a Solution?’ forthcoming, Journal of World Trade Law, 
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wars, China has moved swiftly, in response to imposed and threatened tariffs, to modify its legal regime. 
These changes have, for the present, defused the technology transfer dispute settlement proceedings.4 
Nevertheless, there are sound reasons for considering the TRIPS compatibility of both the repealed 
measures originally referred to in the complaints, and China’s current legal landscape. In particular, did 
China need to modify its measures in order to achieve TRIPS compliance? If so, has compliance now 
been achieved? Going forward, how much flexibility do WTO members have under the TRIPS when 
developing their regulation of technology licensing? The untested question here is the extent to which 
the TRIPS embodies a requirement for commercial freedom in technology transfers or, conversely, the 
extent to which government intervention is required or permitted by way of controlling anti-competitive 
licensing conditions. 
The article appraises China’s outgoing and new measures under two enquiries. The first is whether the 
measures are discriminatory as between national and non-national right holders contrary to the TRIPS 
Article 3.1 national treatment obligation. The second is the extent to which the TRIPS allows non-
discriminatory government regulation of potentially anti-competitive conditions in technology licensing 
agreements under Article 40. The prevailing theme is to establish a shift, as between these two 
questions, from a high consensus norm which is universally accepted and generally well understood, to 
a low consensus norm resulting from historical compromises. This shift has implications for the 
interpretation and application of these norms by panels and the Appellate Body. The national treatment 
norm should be rigorously applied subject to its proper delimitation. In contrast, states should be 
afforded a high, but not unbounded, level of deference in relation to their non-discriminatory control of 
anti-competitive practices in technology licensing. This theme is explained below in the context of the 
overall structure of the article.  
Section I sets the scene by providing an impression of the potentially anti-competitive licensing 
conditions in relation to which states have different views. Particular attention is given to grantback 
clauses which speak to the ownership of improvements made to licensed technology. Section II turns 
to the Chinese measures which seek to regulate these clauses. China is moving from a system which 
applies different rules depending on whether the technology transfer is internal or involves imported 
technology to a unified regime. Going forward, the default rules applicable to internal transfers will 
apply also to technology import contracts. The section assesses the extent to which this development 
increases contractual freedom for technology import contracts, finding that the uplift is more modest 
than at first sight appears. Sections III and IV provide the main thematic substance of the article via the 
proposed distinction between high and low consensus norms, as elaborated below.  
National treatment is undoubtedly a high consensus norm throughout international economic law. 
However, there are outstanding questions under TRIPS Article 3.1. These relate to the precise method 
for identifying disparate impact between nationals and non-nationals, and the relevance of regulatory 
context understood as the idea that respondent states should have the opportunity to explain disparate 
impact with reference to legitimate policy objectives. Section III therefore proposes a framework for 
TRIPS national treatment analysis, and applies this to China’s measures. With reference to the 
                                                          
available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3436484 (visited 9 January 2020); Julia Ya 
Qin, ‘Forced Technology Transfer and the US-China Trade War: Implications for International Economic Law’ 
22 Journal of International Economic Law (2019) 743. 
4 In relation to the US complaint, a request was made in June 2019 to suspend the work of the panel until 31 
December. On 23 December, a further request was made to suspend the work until 29 February 2020. 
WT/DS542/11 China – Certain  Measures Concerning the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights 
Communication from the Panel 10 January 2020. The EU complaint remains in consultations. 
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principles of treaty interpretation, it is argued that understandings developed in the trade in goods and 
services contexts should be carried over, in a modified and restricted form, to the TRIPS context. 
Section IV considers the application of TRIPS Article 40 to non-discriminatory regulation of potentially 
anti-competitive conditions in technology licensing. This question arises because non-discriminatory 
regulation of grantback clauses can nevertheless severely restrict commercial freedom to allocate or 
share the benefits of improvements to licensed technology. The scope for negotiation is lost if grantback 
clauses are effectively prohibited by regulation which allocates improvements to the licensee, whether 
a national or a non-national. The question is therefore whether the TRIPS allows per se prohibitions, 
given their pronounced impact on commercial freedom, or whether more nuanced regulation is required.  
Before engaging directly with Article 40, attention is given to the background against which it was 
drafted and now operates, in order to establish the shift to an area of low consensus. As indicated, 
domestic regulation here reflects state preferences in relation to the balance between intellectual 
property protection and competition law. These two bodies of law pursue common ends which can be 
expressed as fostering innovation, and the dissemination of its outcomes, for the benefit of consumers.5 
However, the regulatory dilemma is that both limited and extensive regulation of technology licensing 
can be depicted as best achieving these ends. Limited regulation may increase the original patent 
holder’s incentives. Licensing terms are an aspect of achieving an acceptable rate of return on viable 
technology against the background of costly research and development, much of which leads only to 
blind alleys.6 Without the permissibility of contract terms like grantback clauses, research leading to 
the discovery of new technology and applications may be impeded. Similarly, but for these contract 
terms, there might be a reluctance to disseminate the technology through licensing. Under this 
perspective, recognizing and protecting market power by prioritizing intellectual property fosters both 
innovation and dissemination. However, limited regulation becomes less appealing if the emphasis is 
more on the benefits created by competition between original patent holders and second-comers. The 
‘but for’ arguments are inverted here. More intrusive regulation, involving the mandatory removal or 
review of certain contract terms, may increase the incentive of licensees to both enter into contracts and 
to improve on the licensed technology.  
State preferences here are dynamic. The line of equilibrium is constantly shifting whether the focus is 
on differences between groups of states at any point in time, or the rules of individual states over time. 
New thinking from economists can result in the re-writing of rules previously expressed as self-evident 
and immutable. This background indicates that interpretations of the main TRIPS provision which 
speaks to the intellectual property / competition interface should seek to accommodate different 
approaches, rather than presume that it reflects and prioritizes one approach to the exclusion of others.  
The analysis then proceeds to TRIPS Article 40. The first question here is whether this provision permits 
blunt per se prohibitions of potentially anti-competitive licensing conditions of the kind that China 
previously applied in relation to technology import contracts. Plausible textual interpretations to allow 
such prohibitions are identified, but dismissed as being incompatible with a standard canon of 
interpretation. The impermissibility of per se prohibitions is, therefore, the first respect in which state 
discretion in this area is not unbounded. However, the question which reveals more about the extent of 
regulatory autonomy is what Article 40 requires of states to show that they have gone beyond an 
                                                          
5 Czapracka describes this alignment as the ‘current mainstream view’ long since accepted by academia and 
regulatory bodies. Kararzyna Czapracka, Intellectual Property and the Limits of Antitrust (2009) Edward Elgar 
37. 
6 Marcus B. Finnegan, ‘A Code of Conduct Regulating International Technology Transfer: Panacea or Pitfall’, 1 
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. (1976) 57, at 58-59. 
4 
 
impermissible per se approach. It is argued here that the national law experience can be relevant by way 
of supplementary means of interpretation. Given that this experience is one of regulatory divergence, 
which depends to some extent on institutional capacity, a low threshold is suggested. Thus, per se 
prohibitions, without any accompanying explanation of the gravity of the competition based concerns, 
would breach Article 40. However, the need for individual assessment should be satisfied by such an 
explanation. This would be a check for a clearly expressed rationale, rather than a review of exactly 
where the balance between protecting intellectual property and competition has been located. This 
modest limitation on state discretion is linked with two meanings of the Article 40 ‘consistency 
requirement’ under which the regulation of anti-competitive practices must be consistent with the 
TRIPS as a whole. Section IV ends by considering whether China’s regulatory trajectory indicates that 
it has met the TRIPS Article 40 threshold. Section V offers an overall conclusion. 
I. POTENTIALLY ANTI-COMPETITIVE LICENSING CONDITIONS 
China’s restrictions on contractual freedom apply in relation to potentially anti-competitive licensing 
conditions. It is therefore necessary to provide an impression of such licensing conditions before turning 
to China’s measures and their TRIPS compatibility.  
The exclusive grantback is a common example of a potentially anti-competitive licensing condition. 
While TRIPS Article 40 refers to ‘exclusive grantback conditions’, no definition of this term is 
provided. Of relevance here is the unadopted UNCTAD Draft International Code of Conduct on the 
Transfer of Technology [Draft Code].7 Near consensus was achieved with the definition, which is the 
first to be provided in a list of 14 practices: 
Requiring the acquiring party to transfer or grant back to the supplying party, or to any other 
enterprise designated by the supplying party, improvements arising from the acquired 
technology, on an exclusive basis [or]* without offsetting consideration or reciprocal obligations 
from the supplying party, or when the practice will constitute an abuse of a dominant market 
position of the supplying party. 
The core idea of what a grantback clause involves is reasonably clear here, albeit that the ‘[or]*’ 
preferred by the Group of 77 (developing countries) begins to reveal differences in negotiating 
positions.8 
A further listed practice in the Draft Code can also be highlighted because of its connection with 
grantback clauses and relevance to China’s measures. The need for grantback clauses is obviated by a 
clause preventing the acquiring party from improving the technology. The Draft Code addresses 
‘Restrictions on adaptations’ as the seventh practice in these terms:   
Restrictions which [unreasonably]** prevent the acquiring party from adapting the imported 
technology to local conditions or introducing innovations in it, or which oblige the acquiring 
party to introduce unwanted or unnecessary design or specification changes, if the acquiring party 
makes adaptations on his own responsibility and without using the technology supplying party's 
name, trade or service marks or trade names, and except to the extent that this adaptation 
                                                          
7 Draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology as at the close of the 6th session of the 
Conference on 5 June 1985: note by the UNCTAD Secretariat, TD/CODE TOT/47. 
8 Read without this addition, the practice which is of concern is narrowed. Not only must the improvement 
belong exclusively to the licensor, but this must also occur without payment or reciprocal obligations from the 
licensor. Read with the addition, the position of the improvement belonging exclusively to the licensor is itself 
of concern irrespective of the position on payment and reciprocity.    
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unsuitably affects those products, or the process for their manufacture, to be supplied to the 
supplying party, his designates, or his other licensees, or to be used as a component or spare part 
in a product to be supplied to his customers. 
Unpicking the meaning here, and reducing the content, the supplying party can legitimately contract for 
the acquiring party to make improvements on their own responsibility, and can also guard against an 
unsuitable adaptation of products to be supplied back to itself. In principle, however, the licensee should 
be permitted to improve the imported technology. The term ‘unreasonably’, which potentially increases 
the scope for clauses which prevent improvement, was promoted by the Group B developed countries. 
II. CHINA’S MEASURES 
The discussion can now turn to the Chinese measure which seeks to regulate these potentially restrictive 
business practices. As indicated, China moved swiftly to revise its legal regime in response to mounting 
trade tensions and the WTO complaints. There were two developments in March 2019, being the 
adoption of a new Foreign Investment Law9 (FIL), which entered into force on 1 January 2020, and the 
removal, with immediate effect, of certain provisions from the Technology Import and Export 
Administrative Regulations (TIER).10 
Article 22 of the FIL provides that the ‘conditions for technological cooperation are to be determined 
through consultation by the various parties to the investment on the basis of equality and the principle 
of fairness’. This language should not be taken to indicate that China will now recognize full freedom 
of contract in the field of technology licensing and that it is unconcerned with potentially anti-
competitive practices in this field. Rather, the question raised is how China will further specify the 
content of the commitments in Article 22. It is possible to envisage some specification of what ‘equality’ 
and ‘fairness’ mean in this context, along with restraints on commercial freedom when the indicators 
of these values are not sufficiently present. Moreover, the FIL covers technology transfer to the extent 
that it involves foreign investment.11 Technology transfer, even from outside of China, may involve 
only licensing without any investment in an enterprise or project in China. In this situation, the TIER 
continues to apply as the FIL only abolishes and replaces identified laws governing foreign 
investment.12 It does not abolish the Foreign Trade Law under which the TIER was adopted.13 
This scope of the FIL explains why the TIER was amended separately in the same time-frame. It would 
have been anomalous to signal a move towards recognizing freedom of contract in principle under the 
FIL for technology transfers involving investment, while leaving in place stringent restrictions under 
the TIER for transfers not involving investment. This position might not have been enough to defuse 
the WTO complaints.  
The now repealed TIER restrictions were as follows. Article 29(3) of the TIER provided for the outright 
prohibition of clauses, ‘restricting the receiving party from improving the technology supplied by the 
supplying party, or restricting the receiving party from using the improved technology’. Grantback 
                                                          
9 Foreign Investment Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted at the Second Session of the 13th National 
People's Congress on March 15, 2019. 
10 State Council Decree No.709 was published on March 18, 2019 and took effect immediately. Paragraph 38 of 
the Decree deletes from the TIER Articles 24(3), 27 and 29.  
11 FIL Article 2 defines foreign investment in a manner indicating ownership by the foreign investor of a 
Chinese enterprise, or the acquisition of a share in such an enterprise.  
12 These are listed in FIL Article 42 as the Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures Law, the Wholly Foreign 
Owned Enterprises Law and the Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures Law. 
13 TIER Article 1. 
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clauses were also effectively subject to a per se prohibition. Under Article 27, this was achieved by a 
positive specification that an improvement, ‘belongs to the party making the improvement’.14 Now that 
these provisions have been repealed, the default provisions are contained in China’s Contract Law.15 
This follows from the relationship between the TIER and the Contract Law. As might be expected, 
China’s Legislation Law envisages a ‘higher legal authority’ for national laws, such as the Contract 
Law, than administrative regulations such as TIER.16 However, the default hierarchy is reversed as the 
Contract Law establishes that it is subordinate to administrative regulations which contain different 
rules on technology transfer.17 The now repealed TIER provisions were a case in point. These provisions 
applied only to ‘technology import contracts’18 rather than also to internal technology transfers. With 
the repeal of these provisions, there is no longer a bifurcated regime for controlling clauses relating to 
improvements, and the ownership thereof. Rather, the Contract Law, as the default instrument, now 
applies to both internal technology transfers and transfers involving an imported technology.  
Unlike the TIER, the Contract Law expresses a freedom of contract approach in principle, while also 
recognizing the potential for anti-competitive practices. Article 354 of the Contract Law (contained in 
Chapter 18) leaves the ‘method of sharing any subsequent improvement resulting from the exploitation 
of the patent’ to the commercial discretion of the parties ‘on the basis of mutual benefit’. Grantback 
clauses, under which any improvement would belong to the licensor, are therefore not prohibited. There 
is no express provision in the Contract Law which speaks to the potentially restrictive practice of 
preventing the licensee from improving the technology. However, it should not be inferred from this 
silence that contracting parties enjoy significant discretion here. The flexibility under Article 354 is 
tempered by Article 329: 
Article 329 Invalidity of Technology-monopolizing and Infringing Contract  
A technology contract which illegally monopolizes technology, impairs technological 
advancement or infringes on the technology of a third person is invalid.     
Article 329 is among the General Provisions of Chapter 18 and therefore applies to Article 354. It clearly 
indicates that the Contract Law does not envisage unqualified freedom of contract at the expense of 
regulating potentially anti-competitive practices. This is confirmed by guidance issued by China’s 
Supreme Court.19 The following provision from the guidance is especially relevant to clauses restricting 
improvements and grantbacks:  
Article 10 The following circumstances shall belong to ‘illegally monopolizing technology and 
impairing technological progress’ mentioned in Article 329 of the Contract Law: 
                                                          
14 Article 27. 
15 Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China 1999 (Contract Law). 
16 Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of China 2000, Article 79. 
17 Contract Law, Chapter 18 Technology Contracts, Section 3 Technology Transfer Contracts, Article 355 
Applicability of Other Laws or Administrative Regulations: Where the relevant laws or administrative 
regulations provide otherwise in respect of technology import/export contracts or in respect of patent contracts 
or contracts for patent application, such provisions prevail. 
18 This phrase is used in both Articles 27 and 29(3). Article 2 defines ‘technology import’ as ‘acts of transferring 
technology from outside the territory of the People's Republic of China into the territory of the People's 
Republic of China’.  
19 Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court concerning: Some Issues on Application of Law for the Trial of 
Cases on Disputes over Technology Contracts Interpretation No. 20 [2004] of the Supreme People’s Court 
Adopted at 1335th meeting of the Judicial Committee of the Supreme People’s Court on November 2004. 
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(1) Restricting one party from making new research and development on the basis of the 
contractual subject technology, or restricting this party from using the improved technology, or 
the conditions for both parties to exchange the improved technologies with each other being not 
reciprocal, including such circumstances requiring one party to gratuitously provide the other 
party with the improved technology, to transfer the improved technology to the other party non-
reciprocally, gratuitously and solely occupy, or jointly own the intellectual property of the 
improved technology … 
 
The impact of Article 329 and the accompanying guidance is to narrow the differences between the 
TIER and the Contract Law. The repeal of the noted TIER provisions, and the applicability of the 
Contract Law, does not mean that technology import contracts have moved from a regime in which 
some clauses are strictly prohibited to a regime in which such clauses are left entirely to the commercial 
discretion of the parties. Indeed, it is possible that there is no difference in the treatment of clauses 
restricting the licensee from improving the technology supplied. The opening example under 
subparagraph (1) above seems to indicate that such clauses are prohibited, just as they were under 
Article 29(3) of the TIER. In contrast, the Contract Law provides for more nuanced regulation of 
grantback clauses than the TIER. They were strictly prohibited under the TIER. Under the Contract 
Law, grantbacks would seem to be permissible in principle provided there is ‘mutual benefit’ which is 
likely to be absent for non-reciprocal or gratuitous grantbacks. It is this permissibility in principle of 
grantback clauses which makes the Contract Law a preferable regime for licensors to the TIER. 
A further indication of China’s nascent policies here is provided by the March 2017 draft Anti-
Monopoly Guidelines on the Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights.20 While only in draft form, there 
are reasons to attribute a high weight to this document. The Guidelines aim to provide content to Article 
55 of China’s 2007 Anti-Monopoly Law21 (AML). The approach developed under the AML is likely to 
be reflected in the FIL, by reason of the AML’s broader and more general scope of application.22 It is 
clear from the Guidelines that China intends to regulate exclusive grantbacks, rather than leave this area 
to the commercial freedom of the parties. Article 8 of the Guidelines refers to, ‘analyzing the impact of 
the exclusive grantback on the exclusion or restriction of the relevant market competition’, along with 
a number of criteria including ‘whether the licensor will provide material consideration for the 
substantial grant-back’ and ‘whether the exclusive grant-back will derogate the enthusiasm of the 
licensee to make improvements’.  
 
The analysis now turns to the compatibility of the outgoing and current measures with the TRIPS Article 
3.1 national treatment obligations. 
III. TRIPS DISCIPLINES ON THE REGULATION OF TECHNOLOGY LICENSING - 
NATIONAL TREATMENT 
                                                          
20 Hereinafter, Guidelines. The Guidelines are available at: 
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/zcfb/201703/20170302539418.shtml (visited 9 January 2020). 
The English translations appearing in the main text were provided by Cherry Chen (PhD candidate). 
21 Anti-Monopoly Law (promulgated by Order No. 68 of August 30, 2007, of the President of the People's 
Republic of China). The English translation is provided be WIPO, 
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/cn/cn099en.pdf (visited 9 January 2020). 
22 This broad and general scope is clearly indicated by AML Article 1: 
 Article 1 This Law is enacted for the purpose of preventing and restraining monopolistic conducts, protecting 
fair competition in the market, enhancing economic efficiency, safeguarding the interests of consumers and the 
public interest and promoting the healthy development of the socialist market economy.  
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Throughout international economic law, including under the TRIPS, national treatment is a high 
consensus norm.23 It follows that non-national patent owners must be permitted to conclude licensing 
contracts with domestic firms on terms that are no less favourable than those applicable to national 
patent owners. Nationals cannot, without sound justification, enjoy more commercial freedom than non-
nationals.  
The simplicity of these propositions is belied by the difficulty of elaborating and applying the exact 
methodology for revealing nationality based discrimination. This is especially so when the regulatory 
distinction embodied in measures is not explicitly framed in terms of nationality – so called cases of 
possible de facto or practical discrimination. Moreover, the TRIPS national treatment obligation is not 
as well understood as other GATT / WTO law non-discrimination norms. Disparate impact as between 
nationals and non-nationals is a required element. However, the Appellate Body has yet to adjudicate 
on whether this is sufficient for a TRIPS national treatment violation, or whether regulatory context 
must also be considered – the opportunity for respondent states to establish that any disparate impact 
can be explained with reference to a legitimate policy objective. This is a given outside of the TRIPS 
context by reason of general exceptions provisions in the GATT and the GATS. It is also clear from an 
interpretation developed by the Appellate Body that regulatory context is an indispensable element of 
the overall appraisal of technical regulations under the TBT Agreement despite the absence of an 
exceptions provision in this agreement. Yet, the only panel to have touched on this question to date in 
the TRIPS context appears to have considered that disparate impact is enough in itself to establish a 
national treatment violation.24 A key purpose of this article is to provide a framework for non-
discrimination analysis under the TRIPS. China’s measures here (now repealed and present) provide an 
opportune moment to develop and test this framework.    
A. The TRIPS Article 3.1 national treatment provision 
TRIPS Article 3.1 provides as follows: 
Each Member shall accord to the nationals of other Members treatment no less favourable than 
that it accords to its own nationals with regard to the protection of intellectual property. 
The term ‘protection’ is defined in note 3 as including, ‘matters affecting the availability, acquisition, 
scope, maintenance and enforcement of intellectual property rights as well as those matters affecting 
the use of intellectual property rights specifically addressed in this Agreement’ (emphasis added). 
The emphasized phrase invites consideration of the intellectual property rights set out in the TRIPS. 
From here, the most relevant provision is within Article 28(2) which requires, in part, that patent owners 
shall have the right, ‘to conclude licensing contracts’. It follows that non-national patent owners are 
entitled to be treated no less favourably than national patent owners in relation to the right to conclude 
licensing contracts. 
                                                          
23 Howse has contrasted the Appellate Body’s willing engagement with non-discrimination norms with its 
circumspect approach towards the ‘post-discriminatory’ provisions in the TBT and SPS agreements. This is 
explained with reference to level of consensus within the WTO’s membership in relation to these norms. Robert 
Howse, ‘The World Trade Organization 20 Years On: Global Governance by Judiciary’ 27 European Journal of 
International Law (2016) 9.   
24 Panel Report, European Communities - Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications  
for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs WT/DS174/290/R, adopted 20 April 2005 (EC – Trademarks / GIs). 
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The TRIPS Article 3.1 ‘treatment no less favourable’ (TNLF) standard has been at issue in a number of 
disputes and has a settled core meaning. TNLF requires ‘effective equality of opportunities’.25 It seems 
incontestable that encountering measures which prohibit certain contract terms is less favourable than 
measures which provide for more flexibility. This was the position, until recently, in relation to 
grantback clauses under the TIER as compared with the Contract Law. This difference in treatment 
could have been subject to an ‘as such’ challenge – that is, a challenge against the law itself as opposed 
to a challenge against the law ‘as applied’ in individual instances.26 It is no defence here to claim that 
the prohibition on grantbacks in the TIER was rarely enforced27 so that such clauses were, in practice, 
left to negotiations between the parties. This is because the TIER provided for a definite and mandatory 
position in relation to each and every occasion of its enforcement, without allowing for the discretion 
to reach a different decision and outcome. 
B. National treatment – establishing disparate impact 
The position described above does not in itself establish a TRIPS Article 3.1 violation. It must also be 
established that the favourable treatment is accorded to Chinese nationals, while the detrimental 
treatment is accorded to nationals of other WTO Members. This is not explicitly evident from the face 
of the measures. As indicated, the less favourable treatment under the TIER which prohibited 
grantbacks depended on whether the contract involved the transfer of technology from outside of China 
into China, rather than the nationality of the licensor. Such a licensor might more commonly be a non-
national of China, but could also be a Chinese national. 
The lack of explicit correspondence between the different treatments and nationality was considered by 
the panel in EC – Trade Marks / GIs.28 In this case, the protection of intellectual property in the form 
of geographical indications (GIs) was less favourable for GIs located outside the EC, than for GIs 
located in the EC. This led the panel to view the case as involving, ‘formally identical provisions vis-
à-vis the nationals of different Members, with respect to the availability of GI protection’.29 The panel 
began its analysis by drawing on a well-established principle of world trade law non-discrimination 
analysis. The TNLF standard may be breached both by measures requiring formally different treatment 
of nationals and non-nationals, and by those requiring formally identical treatment.30 Expressed 
differently, either formally different or formally identical treatment may be required to avoid, or 
remedy, a breach. 
                                                          
25 This language has its origin in a GATT panel report which interpreted the TNLF standard in GATT Article 
III:4 (GATT Panel Report, United States Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, L/6439, adopted 7 November 
1989, BISD 36S/345 para. 5.11 (US – Section 337)). It was first carried over to TRIPS Article 3.1 by the panel 
in Panel Report, United States - Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, WT/DS176/R, adopted 1 
February 2002, paras 8.131 – 8.133 with this usage being approved the Appellate Body in the same case at para 
258. 
26 Further coverage of this distinction is provided in subsection D below. 
27 Infrequent enforcement by China’s Ministry of Commerce was reported in August 2019 by Financier 
Worldwide, ‘Tempered TIER Tantalises US-China Trade War Thaw’, 
https://www.financierworldwide.com/tempered-tier-tantalises-us-china-trade-war-thaw#.XW1LdPBKjIV 
(visited 9 January 2020). 
28 Above n 24. 
29 Ibid, para 7.172. 
30 Ibid, paras 7.172 – 7.174. When the comparison is between domestic and imported goods, this principle has 
its origin in the GATT panel report in US – Section 337 (above n 25) para. 5.11. In the trade in services context, 




There is scope for misunderstanding here in terms of accurately locating the case within the overall 
body of non-discrimination analysis. Measures involving formally identical treatment can undoubtedly 
involve less favourable treatment in practice for imported products or non-nationals. However, this area 
is most closely associated (perhaps exclusively so) with cases in which there is only one treatment at 
issue. For example, in Dominican  Republic – Cigarettes, all cigarettes, domestic and imported, had to 
bear a tax stamp in order to be lawfully marketed. This breached the GATT Article III:4 TNLF standard 
on the basis that the one identical treatment was, in practice, more burdensome for imported cigarettes.31 
As there is only one treatment here, encountered by all cigarettes, it cannot be part of the analysis to 
consider the overall distribution and relative proportions of domestic and imported goods (nationals and 
non-nationals) encountering differing treatments. 
This cannot be what the EC – Trade Marks / GIs panel had in mind when it referred to ‘formally 
identical provisions’. It must, rather, have had in mind the situation when there is more than one 
treatment at issue, but where each treatment is at least identical in the one respect of being formally 
available to nationals and non-nationals. The contortion in this explanation and scope for 
misunderstanding could have been avoided by not framing the case as involving formally identical 
provisions. The case is easier to understand by emphasizing that it involved different treatments which 
were, in principle, accessible to nationals and non-nationals. For these kinds of cases, the TNLF analysis 
differs because it is possible to consider the overall distribution and relative proportions of nationals 
and non-nationals encountering the different treatments.  
Under world trade law TNLF standards, evidence of this kind is key to revealing de facto discrimination. 
An alternative approach, involving a much lower threshold, was raised by the US in EC – Trade Marks 
/ GIs.32 Under this extreme, it is sufficient that there is one non-national subjected to the less favourable 
treatment, and one national eligible for the favourable treatment. This approach is not unknown in 
international economic law. It is at least prevalent, if not even the dominant approach in investor state 
dispute settlement. The term ‘best treatment’ is used here, because the focus is on the most favourable 
treatment accorded to a national to which the non-national claimant is then entitled.33 However, world 
trade law has preferred an approach referred to as the ‘group comparison’.34 This comparison is required 
when there are different treatments, one less favourable than the other, which are not explicitly allocated 
based on nationality or a direct proxy for nationality. The comparison is between the group of non-
nationals wishing to access the favourable treatment with the group of nationals wishing to access the 
favourable treatment. Within both groups, there can be persons entitled to and debarred from the 
favourable treatment. The question is whether, overall, or disproportionately, non-nationals are 
debarred from the favourable treatment. 
Upon applying the group comparison test, the panel found there to be a very strong correspondence 
between the location of the GI (the formal criterion on which the different treatments turned) and the 
                                                          
31 Panel Report, Dominican Republic – Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes, 
WT/DS302/R, adopted 19 May 2005, paras 7.184 – 7.194.  
32 Above n 24, para 7.187. 
33 Interpreting the NAFTA Article 1102 national treatment principle, the Pope & Talbot tribunal noted that, ‘ 
…“no less favorable” means equivalent to, not better or worse than, the best treatment accorded to the 
comparator’. Pope & Talbot Inc. v Government of Canada (Award on the Merits of Phase 2, 2001) para 42. For 
analysis of this area, see, Arwel Davies, ‘Group Comparison Vs. Best Treatment in International Economic Law 
Non-discrimination Analysis’ in Andrea K. Bjorklund (ed.) Yearbook on International Investment Law & Policy 
(2014-2015) Oxford University Press 111. 
34Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing 
Products, WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001, para 100. 
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nationality of the GI holder.35 Indeed, there was no clear evidence in the case of even a single non-
national eligible for the favourable treatment – that is a non-national holding a GI located in the EC.36 
Therefore, the group comparison test revealed very pronounced de facto discrimination in this case. 
It seems likely that the same outcome would be reached when applying the group comparison test to 
the different treatments envisaged (until the recent changes) in the Contract Law and the TIER in 
relation to grantbacks. Complaining states are likely to be able to readily establish that non-nationals 
disproportionally transfer technology from outside of China into China thereby encountering the less 
favourable treatment under the TIER (grantbacks prohibited). Conversely, the internal transfer of 
technology encountering the relatively favourable treatment under the Contract Law (grantbacks 
permitted in principle) would be more likely to involve a national as the licensor than a non-national. 
While the distinction between transferring technology from outside of China and internal transfers does 
not amount to a direct proxy for nationality, the phrase ‘close substitute criteria’37 is probably apt. 
C. TRIPS national treatment and regulatory context 
The next question is whether disparate impact, as revealed by the group comparison, suffices to establish 
a violation of TRIPS Article 3.1, or whether regulatory context can be raised by the respondent state in 
order to prevent or exonerate a violation. In world trade law, arguments in relation to regulatory context 
are most closely associated with the general exceptions in GATT Article XX. In the Uruguay Round 
agreements, this provision was included in an amended form in GATS Article XIV, but not in the TRIPS 
or the TBT Agreement. However, general exceptions-based arguments are possible under the main TBT 
non-discrimination provision by reason of the Appellate Body’s interpretation of the TBT Article 2.1 
TNLF favourable standard. Detrimental impact is not dispositive; the remaining question is, according 
to the Appellate Body, whether it ‘stems exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction’.38 The 
open question here is whether this interpretation applies equally, or in some modified form, under the 
TRIPS Article 3.1 TNLF standard. 
The coverage below sets out the strongest points for why, as a matter of treaty interpretation, the 
meaning of TNLF under TBT Article 2.1 should be carried over in a modified and restricted form to 
TRIPS Article 3.1. The points relate to how the Appellate Body found a right to regulate to be embodied 
in the TBT, and how these considerations carry over to the TRIPS. 
Under the General Rule of Interpretation set out in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties39 (VCLT), a treaty preamble is relevant in two ways. It provides relevant context for the 
interpretation of terms within a treaty and sheds light on the object and purpose of the treaty; a matter 
which itself informs the process of attributing meaning and content to treaty terms. When the Appellate 
Body first interpreted the TNLF standard in TBT 2.1, much weight was attributed to the sixth recital of 
the TBT preamble: 
Recognizing that no country should be prevented from taking measures necessary to ensure the 
quality of its exports, or for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, of the 
environment, or for the prevention of deceptive practices, at the levels it considers appropriate, 
                                                          
35 EC – Trade Marks / GIs, above n 24, paras 7.194 – 7.197. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid, para 7.199. 
38 Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, 
WT/DS406/AB/R, adopted 24 April 2012, para 182. 
39 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980), 
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, No. 18232. 
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subject to the requirement that they are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means 
of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail 
or a disguised restriction on international trade, and are otherwise in accordance with the 
provisions of this Agreement 
This recital is clearly inspired by the text GATT Article XX, albeit that it reverses the structure by 
placing a list of policy objectives before language which is found in the chapeau of Article XX. The 
phrase ‘at the levels it considers appropriate’ is new, but this reflects the Appellate Body’s jurisprudence 
to the effect that it will not interfere with the chosen level of protection of the value at stake.40 More 
genuinely new is the closing safeguard of the measure at issue being ‘otherwise in accordance with’ the 
TBT. It is difficult to give any separate and distinct meaning to this language while avoiding circularity. 
Members can protect public health provided the measure is not discriminatory contrary to TBT Article 
2.1. However, this is merely to beg the question of what a full analysis under Article 2.1 should look 
like, and whether it should involve consideration of regulatory context. Bearing in mind that the sixth 
recital mainly sets out a permission to regulate in specific and familiar terms, it is unlikely that the more 
general closing language was intended to significantly constrain this permission. Ultimately, the closing 
language is best interpreted as an admonition against abuse of the undoubted right to regulate. It is 
possible to question whether this additional language was required, just as it is possible to question 
whether the GATT Article XX chapeau is required when the ‘necessary’ standard, also found in the 
sixth recital above, arguably provides a sufficient safeguard against abuse of the exceptions. When the 
Appellate Body drew interpretative guidance from the sixth recital, it did not explicitly link the closing 
language with its incorporation of regulatory context into TBT 2.1. Nevertheless, there is perhaps a link 
between the closing language (consistency with Article 2.1 must be achieved) and the strictness of the 
test that any disparate impact must be capable of being explained ‘exclusively’ with reference to a 
legitimate purpose. 
More generally, the recital merely reflects an indispensable tenet of trade law non-discrimination 
analysis. It is no exaggeration to state that disparate impact cannot possibly be enough to establish 
discrimination under TBT 2.1.41 Such an interpretation would have eviscerated the right to regulate, 
since even pronounced disparate impact can be a feature of measures which can be fully explained with 
reference to a legitimate non-protectionist purpose. When such explanation is possible, the detrimental 
impact must be accepted and exonerated as an incidental consequence of protecting the value at stake. 
When assessing the extent to which this reasoning carries over to TRIPS Article 3.1, the logical starting 
point is to identify the provision which bears the strongest resemblance to the sixth recital of the TBT 
preamble. The closest TRIPS provision provides as follows: 
Article 8 
Principles 
1. Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt measures 
necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of 
                                                          
40 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WT/DS332/AB/R, adopted 
17 December 2007, para 156; Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border 
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R, adopted 20 April 2005, para 308. See, Michael 
Ming Du, ‘Autonomy in Setting Appropriate Level of Protection Under WTO Law: Rhetoric or Reality?’, 13 
Journal of International Economic Law (2010) 1077.  
41 See Federico Ortino, ‘From “non-discrimination” to “reasonableness”: a paradigm shift in international 
economic law?’ Jean Monnet Working Paper 01/05. 
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vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development, provided that such 
measures are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.   
Much like a preamble, this provision is also relevant by way of context, and object and purpose when 
interpreting any other TRIPS provision.42 While Article 8.1 is not a direct analogue for the sixth recital, 
the two provisions have much in common. Both embody a list of public policy objectives which can 
permissibly inform regulatory developments, and both specify the ‘necessary’ standard for the nexus 
between measures adopted and the pursuit of the objective. Both provisions also end with the safeguard 
of measures having to be otherwise consistent with the Agreement. As argued above, this language is 
best interpreted as directed towards preventing abuse of the right to pursue the listed objectives. If it is 
arguably otiose under the sixth recital of the TBT preamble, it is less so in TRIPS Article 8.1 because 
this provision does not reproduce the chapeau of GATT Article XX. 
A credible argument can be made that, within the TRIPS, Article 8.1 informs the interpretation of 
Article 3.1 in the same way as, within the TBT, the sixth recital informs the interpretation of Article 
2.1. If this is correct, disparate impact does not in itself establish an Article 3.1 violation. This disparate 
impact will not reflect discrimination if it can be explained exclusively with reference to a policy 
objective specifically referred to in the TRIPS, including in Article 8.1. This argument can be tested 
from two perspectives. First, why is the broader formulation of any ‘legitimate regulatory distinction’ 
which, according to the Appellate Body, applies under TBT 2.1 not recommended here? From the 
opposite perspective, are there valid arguments to the effect that disparate impact is enough in itself 
under TRIPS Article 3.1? 
1. Why not any ‘legitimate regulatory distinction’? 
There is a strong basis for the broader non-exhaustive approach under TBT 2.1, which does not carry 
over to TRIPS 3.1. Under TBT 2.2, even non-discriminatory technical regulations can be reviewed for 
imposing ‘unnecessary obstacles to international trade’. This provision uses the term ‘inter alia’ in 
connection with a list of policy objectives which members can pursue. The explicitly non-exhaustive 
list under TBT 2.2 strongly indicates that the same approach should apply under 2.1. 
The TRIPS does not have a directly equivalent provision to TBT 2.2 which sets out a non-exhaustive 
list of policy objectives. This suggests that the policy objectives which can be considered under the 
TRIPS Article 3.1 TNLF standard should be limited to those listed in other TRIPS provisions. This 
position is reinforced by considering the differences between TRIPS Article 3.1, and TBT Article 2.1 – 
the respective national treatment provisions. TBT Article 2.1 does not refer to any policy objective and 
does not itself contain any exception. In isolation, the provision leaves the question of policy objectives 
entirely open. However, as indicated, the interpretative context only needs to be extended to Article 2.2 
to find a list of non-exhaustive policy objectives. In contrast, TRIPS 3.1 incorporates by reference the 
exceptions in pre-existing intellectual property instruments. These exceptions are focused and narrow43 
and have no bearing on a general right to regulate - the question of balancing intellectual property rights 
                                                          
42 While this approach to interpretation is already required by VCLT Article 31(1), its applicability is reinforced 
by paragraph 5 of the Doha Declaration, adopted by Ministers on 14 November 2001, which provides that, ‘[i]n 
applying the customary rules of interpretation of public international law, each provision of the TRIPS 
Agreement shall be read in the light of the object and purpose of the Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its 
objectives and principles’.  
43 For example, under the Paris Convention, Article 2.3 provides: The provisions of the laws of each of the 
countries of the Union relating to judicial and administrative procedure and to jurisdiction, and to the 
designation of an address for service or the appointment of an agent, which may be required by the laws on 
industrial property, are expressly reserved. 
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with broader legitimate policy objectives. The point, however, is that the drafters clearly considered 
what exceptions should be explicitly incorporated in Article 3. When combined with the absence of a 
non-exhaustive list of policy objectives in any TRIPS provision, this makes it difficult to interpret the 
TRIPS Article 3.1 TNLF standard in exactly the same manner as the TBT Article 2.1 TNLF standard. 
As noted, however, TRIPS Article 8.1 does provide an exhaustive list of objectives. Respondent states 
should therefore be permitted to raise these objectives in order to explain detrimental impact under 
TRIPS Article 3.1. To deny this opportunity would amount to interpreting a TRIPS provision in 
isolation from its context and the object and purpose of the Agreement.44 The discussion now turns to 
the opposite perspective of whether there are plausible arguments to the effect that disparate impact 
should be enough to establish a TRIPS Article 3.1 violation. 
2. Should disparate impact suffice? 
In a rather opaque section of its report entitled ‘Defences based on systemic considerations’, the EC – 
Trade Marks / GIs panel seemed to be of the view that it would not be appropriate to import a GATT 
Article XX like analysis into the TRIPS. The panel was responding to an argument made by the EC that 
‘one must take account of the absence in the TRIPS Agreement of a general exceptions provision 
analogous to Article XX of GATT 1994’.45 Part of the panel’s rationale for rejecting this argument was 
as follows: 
 
…the TRIPS Agreement does not generally provide for the grant of positive rights to exploit or 
use certain subject matter, but rather provides for the grant of negative rights to prevent certain 
acts.  This fundamental feature of intellectual property protection inherently grants Members 
freedom to pursue legitimate public policy objectives since many measures to attain those public 
policy objectives lie outside the scope of intellectual property rights and do not require an 
exception under the TRIPS Agreement.46 
 
This is a prescient statement in light of the panel report in Australia – Tobacco Plain Packaging. TRIPS 
Article 16.1 sets out the negative right under which trademark owners must be recognized as having the 
exclusive right to prevent certain unauthorized uses of their trademarks by third parties. This negative 
right, which does not refer to the use of a trademark by its owner, is not infringed by measures restricting 
or prohibiting the use of trademarks on tobacco packaging. This is the position irrespective of the public 
policy objective which informed the measures. The provision also ‘does not imply a trademark owner’s 
right to maintain or develop distinctiveness of a trademark or constitute a general obligation for 
Members to refrain from taking regulatory measures that may negatively affect the distinctiveness of 
trademarks’.47 Rather, Article 16.1 is infringed if domestic law fails to provide the trademark owner 
with the right to challenge and prevent certain activities by unauthorized third parties.48 
 
In contrast, TRIPS Article 20 recognizes the entitlement of ‘[t]he use of a trademark in the course of 
trade’. It is clear that such an entitlement could be infringed by plain packaging legislation. Therefore, 
we would not expect a violation to be confirmed without consideration of regulatory context, whether 
within Article 20 itself or under an exceptions provision. The former possibility applies under Article 
                                                          
44 This position of allowing states to invoke at least the policy objectives envisaged in the TRIPS can be found 
in the academic literature. See, Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfus, A Neofederalist Vision of TRIPS: 
The Resilience of the International Intellectual Property Regime (2012) at 102. 
45 EC – Trademarks / GIs (above n 24, para 7.207). It is unclear what the EC had in mind here although, as 
respondent state, it is reasonable to suppose that it was arguing in favour of a GATT Article XX like analysis 
within TRIPS Article 3.1.  
46 Ibid para. 7.210. 
47 Panel Report, Australia – Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, Geographical Indications and Other 
Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, WT/DS435,441,458,467/R, 
adopted 27 August 2019, para 7.2402 (Australia – Tobacco Plain Packaging) para 7.2038. 
48 Ibid, para 7.1978. 
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20 which is infringed only when the use is ‘unjustifiably encumbered by special requirements’. The 
term ‘unjustifiably’ led the panel to undertake an analysis strongly resembling aspects of GATT Article 
XX and TBT Article 2.2.49 
 
It follows that the reasoning in the quoted passage from EC – Trade Marks / GIs is compelling when 
applied in the context of negative rights under the TRIPS, but it cannot be used to deny the availability 
of a GATT Article XX like analysis under Article 3.1. The passage is carefully qualified. The TRIPS 
does not ‘generally’ provide for positive rights, but sometimes it does. While ‘many’ measures to attain 
public policy goals lie outside the scope of intellectual property rights, some measure lie within this 
scope. The main right at issue in this article is a case in point. Under TRIPS Article 28.2, patent owners 
must have the positive right to conclude licensing contracts and this right must be available consistently 
with the national treatment obligation of TRIPS Article 3.1. When the principles of treaty interpretation 
are applied, which require the taking into account of context and object and purpose, the meaning which 
emerges is that this right is only infringed if there is disparate impact in relation to the scope of its 
availability which cannot be explained exclusively with reference to the public policy objectives 
explicitly envisaged in the TRIPS. 
 
3. Applying the proposed test 
 
As indicated above, it is unlikely that the established disparate impact would withstand scrutiny under 
what has now been proposed as the final stage of analysis under the TRIPS Article 3.1 TNLF standard. 
Within this final stage, there would be three considerations. First, the regulatory objectives of the 
challenged measures would need to established. The second question is whether these objectives 
resonate sufficiently with those envisaged in the TRIPS. Thirdly, it would need to be determined 
whether the disparate impact can be explained exclusively with reference to an objective which, by this 
stage of the analysis, would be accepted as legitimate under the TRIPS. 
 
It is not known what policy objectives China might have invoked in order to explain the detrimental 
impact caused by the difference between the Contract Law and the TIER. Some limited guidance may 
be drawn from the Section 301 investigation which refers to the TIER as necessary to ‘safeguard the 
legitimate rights and interests of the licensees who have a weak position in international technology 
transfer negotiations’.50 For ease of exposition, it will be supposed both that this policy objective might 
have been accepted as the true objective of the TIER51 and that this objective might have been accepted 
as legitimate under the TRIPS.52 
 
A more definite position can be offered on the third test. The conclusion here would inevitably be that 
the disparate impact reflects discrimination rather than the exclusive pursuit of a legitimate objective. 
The regulatory distinction which creates the disparate impact is between technology transfer within 
China and transfer from outside of China. The problem is that imbalanced licensing contracts could be 
present and absent on both sides of the regulatory distinction. The distinction is therefore overly blunt. 
It results in false positives, in the sense of catching some transactions involving no imbalance, and false 
negatives, in the sense of failing to catch some transactions which do involve an imbalance. Put 
differently, the distinction would only be acceptable if all technology transfers from outside of China 
into China involved an imbalance, while no technology transfer within China involved an imbalance. 
 
                                                          
49 Ibid, paras 7.2957 – 7.2958. 
50 United States Trade Representative, Findings of the Investigation into China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices 
Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation Under Section 301 Of The Trade Act Of 
1974, 22 March 2018, p 55. 
51 The Appellate Body has clarified that it is for panels to make an independent assessment of the proposed 
objective of challenged measures. Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Concerning the 
Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WT/DS381/AB/R, adopted 13 June 2012 para 
314. 
52 The objective of avoiding imbalanced licensing contracts does seem to resonate with several TRIPS 
provisions including Articles 8.2 and 40.2 which are provided in Section V(B) . 
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In US – Tuna II (Mexico), the ideas of ‘calibration’ and ‘even-handedness’ can be seen as involving the 
detection and assessment of false positives and negatives. Eligibility for the dolphin safe label was 
insufficiently calibrated to the risk that dolphins may be harmed when tuna is caught. While the measure 
responded strongly to this risk when arising from setting on dolphins in the eastern tropical Pacific (a 
true positive), it did not address this risk when arising from other fishing methods outside this region (a 
false negative). The measure was not therefore even-handed as between different fishing methods and 
locations.53 Similarly, in EC – Seal Products, there was ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination’ 
contrary to the chapeau of GATT Article XX, by reason of a false negative. The regulatory distinction 
here was between seal products derived from commercial hunts from Canada and Norway, which were 
banned, and seal products from Inuit Community (IC) hunts in Greenland, which were permitted to be 
placed on the EU market.54  Under the chapeau, there was, in effect, a false negative caused by 
insufficient regulatory concern for seal welfare arising from IC hunts.55 This meant that the regulatory 
distinction could not be sufficiently reconciled with the policy objective of public morals. It is 
interesting that the search for false positives and negatives provides a means of understanding and 
reconciling the analysis which is effectively occurring under formally different treaty language in TBT 
Article 2.1 and the chapeau of GATT Article XX. This observation strengthens the view that the same 
approach should apply under the same treaty language – TNLF under TBT Article 2.1 and TRIPS 
Article 3.1. 
 
To conclude, the TRIPS requires that patent owners must have the right to conclude licensing contracts 
without discrimination between national and non-national patent owners. It is reasonably clear that 
China’s different treatment of grantback clauses in the TIER and Contract Law was not in conformity 
with this obligation. 
 
D. National treatment – China’s revised regulation 
 
Staying with TRIPS Article 3.1, the analysis now moves to China’s current treatment of grantbacks. 
Now that Article 27 of the TIER has been removed, grantbacks are subject only to the Contract Law 
both when the contract involves a transfer from outside of China, and internal transfers. The main point 
here is the move away from the possibility of an ‘as such’ challenge, at least when this concept is 
understood in its traditional sense as directed against the law itself. This is because the treatment of 
grantbacks is now subject to one written instrument which is not on its face, or via its inherent operation 
in practice, more burdensome for non-nationals. In particular, the Contract Law does not operate on the 
basis of close substitute criteria for nationality. However, the Contract Law does provide for the exercise 
of discretion in the review of grantback clauses, and it is possible that this process could be tainted with 
nationality based considerations. 
 
Traditionally in the trade law acquis, a challenge here would be against the law ‘as applied’ in an 
individual instance. In the event of a successful claim, the individual application of the law is confirmed 
as a violation, while leaving intact the law itself. This could be a satisfactory outcome, at least in terms 
of obtaining a confirmation that a violation has occurred, rather than obtaining a retrospective remedy. 
An example might be when a grantback is disallowed explicitly on the basis that the licensor is a non-
national – in other words an isolated case in which what ought to have been an objective assessment 
has clearly been tainted with nationality-based considerations. In contrast, the ‘as applied’ challenge is 
less satisfactory when there is a consistent pattern of behaviour in the application of national laws, 
which calls into question whether non-nationals are systematically being treated less favourably than 
nationals. There may well be a desire to address this pattern of behaviour directly, rather than for each 
and every instance of its manifestation. This limitation of the ‘as applied’ challenge has led the 
Appellate Body both to broaden the understanding of the ‘as such’ challenge and to clarify that the 
                                                          
53 Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico) above n 51 para 297. 
54 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting the Importation and Marketing of Seal 
Products, WT/DS400,401/AB/R, adopted 18 June 2014, para 5.316. 
55 Ibid, para 5.320. 
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types of measures subject to challenge are not exhaustively identified by the ‘as such’ / ‘as applied’ 
distinction. 
 
In US – Zeroing (EC),56 the Appellate Body recognized that ‘as such’ claims are not limited to rules or 
norms expressed in writing. They are also available, in principle, for unwritten rules such as the lines 
of computer code in software used for anti-dumping calculations. The criteria for establishing the 
existence of an unwritten rule or norm capable of challenge on an ‘as such’ basis are no different to 
those applying to written rules or norms. The complainant must establish that the rule or norm is 
attributable to the responding member, its precise content, and that the rule or norm has general and 
prospective application.57 The difference, of course, is that the second and third elements here will often 
be substantially more difficult to satisfy in relation to unwritten measures.58 This problem did not arise 
in the case itself by reason of the nature of the unwritten measure at issue. The lines of computer code 
were a constant feature, which had in all instances and over an extended period, excluded ‘comparison 
results with negative margins in the numerator of the dumping margin’.59 In contrast, real and 
pronounced difficulties are far more likely to be encountered for alleged unwritten measures in the form 
of a hidden policy to disallow grantback clauses in transfers involving non-nationals. As noted by the 
Appellate Body, the existence of unwritten rules or norms should not be lightly assumed.60 Evidence of 
the ‘systematic application’ of the alleged rule or norm will be of high relevance here.61 
 
Formally, the tests above only establish the existence of a measure susceptible to an ‘as such’ challenge. 
In practice, however, satisfying these tests would also go some way towards establishing a TRIPS 
Article 3.1 violation. It is clearly of relevance here to establish that grantback clauses are systematically 
disallowed in transfers involving non-nationals. However, this would only amount to the disparate 
impact required for a national treatment violation to the extent that use of grantback clauses by national 
licensors is permitted. A panel would need to be satisfied that non-nationals disproportionately 
encounter the less favourable treatment (grantbacks disallowed) relative to nationals, and regulatory 
context would then need to be considered. 
 
As indicated, the further doctrinal development is the recognition in US – Continued Zeroing that the 
‘as such’ / ‘as applied’ distinction does not govern and exhaust the definition of measures capable of 
challenge in WTO dispute settlement.62 Members enjoy discretion in how to describe the measure being 
challenged with the only ultimate requirement being that it is an act or omission attributable to another 
member.63 In turn, the manner in which the measure is characterized bears upon the evidence which is 
relevant to proving the existence of the measure. Thus, going back a step, if the measure is characterized 
as a written or unwritten rule or norm of general and prospective application, this characterization also 
provides the key test for the existence of the measure – the idea of general and prospective application. 
In contrast, if a member chooses not to describe a measure as having general and prospective 
application, this will not be a factor in determining the existence of the measure. The Appellate Body 
has signalled that some elements are of a universal nature. It will always be necessary to establish 
attribution and the precise content of the measure.64 In contrast, any further elements depend on how 
                                                          
56 Appellate Body Report, United States – Laws, Regulations for Calculating Dumping Margins (‘Zeroing’), 
WT/DS294/AB/R, adopted 9 May 2006. 
57 Ibid, para198. 
58 See, CheriseValles, VitaliyPogoretskyy, TatianaYanguas ‘Challenging Unwritten Measures in the World 
TradeOrganization: The Need for Clear Legal Standards’ 22 Journal of International Economic Law (2019) 459 
at 460. 
59 US – Zeroing, above n 56, para 199. 
60 Ibid, para196. 
61 Ibid, para198. 
62 Appellate Body Report, United States – Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing Methodology, 
WT/DS350/AB/R, adopted 19 February 2009, para 179. 
63 Appellate Body Report, United States – Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping Duties on Corrosion-Resistant 
Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan, WT/DS244/AB/R, adopted 9 January 2004, para 81. 
64 Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Measures Affecting the Importation of Goods, 
WT/DS438,444,445/AB/R, adopted 26 January 2015, para 5.108. 
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the measure is described. In the example of a written or unwritten measure involving ‘ongoing conduct’, 
the Appellate Body has identified the further element as ‘evidence of its repeated application, and the 
likelihood that such conduct will continue’.65 
 
It will be a challenge to conceptualize this development. It is difficult to see how a measure involving 
‘ongoing conduct’ is anything other than an interchangeable way of describing a measure involving 
‘general and prospective application’. It may be that what the Appellate Body recognized in US – 
Continued Zeroing is the possibility of aggregating a number of individual ‘as applied’ claims into one 
complaint, thereby enabling an efficient tightening of the net in relation to zeroing at different points in 
the life-cycle of an anti-dumping measure.  
 
In sum, the main point here is the increased evidential burden for establishing the existence and content 
of alleged measures which find no expression in laws, or regulations, or in the individual discretionary 
decisions of state officials – in the present context an unwritten policy to systematically reject grantback 
clauses in transfers involving non-nationals. It is also difficult in a national treatment analysis to keep 
separate the existence and content of the measure, from the question of whether the measure amounts 
to a violation. As indicated, establishing that grantback clauses are systematically disallowed in 
transfers involving non-nationals is the first step in establishing a violation. In order to establish 
disparate impact, it would then need to be established that non-nationals disproportionately encounter 
this less favourable treatment compared to nationals.  
 
Finally, the coverage of regulatory context above can be briefly revisited. A definite conclusion was 
previously offered in relation to the different treatment of grantbacks in the TIER and the Contract Law. 
The disparate impact here could not possibly be exonerated with reference to the objective of preventing 
unfair and imbalanced licensing contracts due to the regulatory distinction resulting in false positives 
and negatives. In the different context of a single set of rules under the Contract Law involving the 
exercise of discretion in individual cases, there would be scope for filtering out these false positives and 
negatives. It is at least possible that true positives might be more likely in contracts involving a non-
national than in contracts involving nationals. The key point is that regulatory context must be part of 
the TRIPS national treatment analysis if raised by a respondent. Disparate impact, even if pronounced, 
is not enough in itself to establish a violation.  
 
IV. TRIPS DISCIPLINES ON THE REGULATION OF TECHNOLOGY LICENSING – 
BEYOND NATIONAL TREATMENT 
 
The question here is the extent to which the TRIPS embodies a requirement for commercial freedom in 
technology transfers, or, conversely, the extent to which government intervention is required or 
permitted. Consideration is first given to the background against which the relevant TRIPS provisions 
were developed and now operate in order to establish the shift to an area of low consensus. The analysis 
then turns to the relevant provisions. It is argued that they are correctly interpreted as affording a high, 
but not unbounded, level of flexibility towards national legal systems.  
 
A. Background considerations – Absence of stable international consensus 
 
Before turning to the relevant TRIPS provisions, attention is first given to the background against which 
they were developed and now operate. There is no stable international agreement on the optimal extent 
of regulation of potentially anti-competitive practices in licensing. The absence of consensus is 
illustrated below at both a macro and micro level. At the macro level, the unadopted UNCTAD Draft 
Code66 represented a failure to reconcile the positions of developed and developing countries in this 
area. As will be explained, it was understood by the time of the TRIPS negotiations that a firm common 
                                                          
65 Ibid. 
66 See Section 1. 
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agreed position could not be achieved, thereby affirming ‘residual sovereignty’.67 At the micro level, 
an example of an about-turn in the EU’s internal rules is offered in the direction of a tightening of 
control over grantback clauses.  
 
1. From the unadopted UNCTAD Draft Code to the TRIPS 
 
The unadopted UNCTAD Draft Code was referred to above with reference to the definition of 
grantbacks and clauses restricting improvements by the licensee. As noted, developing countries 
generally preferred more expansive and less qualified definitions of potentially anti-competitive 
licensing conditions. In addition, it may be noted that there was no agreement on how these practices 
should be regulated.68 The contentious nature of the legal status of any international instrument on 
technology transfer was understood at an early stage of the UNCTAD negotiations. The matter was 
effectively deferred in 1976 with drafting of the code to proceed ‘without prejudice to its legal nature’ 
and decided upon by UNCTAD when it received a text for consideration.69  Almost a decade later, the 
criteria for the application of restrictive business practices was identified by an UNCITRAL report as 
an outstanding issue.70 The narrative here is unclear on whether any negotiating group called for the 
per se unacceptability of the listed practices, or whether there was agreement that case by case 
assessment would always or generally be required.71 Any such agreement would have amounted to a 
softening in the position of the Group of 77 countries.72 
 
The TRIPS negotiations presented a new opportunity for establishing international rules on the control 
of intellectual property related anti-competitive practices. Developed countries were disinclined to re-
visit this matter73 indicating they must have viewed the area as falling within their residual sovereignty. 
In contrast, developing countries sought explicit recognition of this residual sovereignty and wished to 
see it specified in broad terms. In particular, they sought recognition of the permissibility of a per se 
approach towards certain practices, which would be deemed to be inherently unacceptable.74 There is a 
subtle but significant movement here away from the earlier failed UNCTAD negotiations. There is no 
longer an attempt by developing countries to establish an international instrument setting out practices 
which are prohibited on a per se basis. Rather, the more limited ambition in the TRIPS negotiations was 
to enshrine a discretion for individual states to adopt a per se approach in their domestic legislation. 
This movement narrowed the scope of disagreement between developed and developing countries. By 
the TRIPS negotiations, there was broad agreement that the control of anti-competitive licensing 
                                                          
67 This term is used by J. H. Reichman and David Lange, ‘Bargaining around the TRIPS Agreement: The Case 
for Ongoing Public-Private Initiatives to Facilitate Worldwide Intellectual Property Transactions’, 9 Duke 
Journal of Comparative and International Law 11(1998) at 22. 
68 The most relevant provision here is in Chapter 2 which identifies the ninth objective of the Draft Code as 
being: ‘To specify restrictive [business] practices from which parties to technology transfer transactions [shall] 
[should] refrain.’ 
69 Davidow and Chiles detail several decisions to this effect. Joel Davidow and Lisa Chiles, ‘The United States 
and the Issue of the Binding or Voluntary Nature of International Codes of Conduct Regarding Restrictive 
Business Practices’, 72 American Journal of International Law (1978) 247 at 252-253. 
70 Legal Aspects of Technology Transfer: Current Activities of the International Organizations Within the 
United Nations System, UNCITRAL A/CN.9/269, 14 March 1985. 
71 Ibid. This ambivalence is evident in para 27. 
72 The Draft Code of 1985 was preceded by separate instruments drafted by developed countries and the Group 
of 77.  The latter instrument envisaged a per se prohibition against non-reciprocal grantback clauses. Draft Texts 
Submitted to the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on an International Code of Conduct on Transfer of 
Technology, 17 I.L.M. 453 (1978), Annex II, Chapter IV. 
73 Resource Book on TRIPS and Development: An Authoritative and practical guide to the TRIPS Agreement by 
UNCTAD and ICTSD (2005) (UNCTAD Resource Book) at p 543. 
74 Gervais refers to the original draft text in the 1990 Brussels draft as having been submitted by a group of 
developing countries. Daniel Gervais, ‘The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis (2008) at p 552. 
Article 40 paragraph 2B of this draft provided: ‘PARTIES may specify in their legislation licensing practices or 
conditions that may be deemed to constitute an abuse of intellectual property rights or to have an adverse effect 
on competition in the relevant market …’ (emphasis added). The term ‘deemed’ is used a further two times in 
the provision and provides a clear indication of the desired permissibility of a per se approach.   
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conditions is a matter for individual states. The only disagreement pertained to how much the TRIPS 
should limit the exercise of residual sovereignty in this area by, for example, prohibiting a per se 
approach. 
 
The extent to which this disagreement is resolved in the TRIPS is considered in the next section. 
However, the point here is that the absence of a stable consensus on regulating anti-competitive 
licensing practices is reflected in the lack of any attempt in the TRIPS negotiations to establish a list of 
practices which all signatories would recognize as inherently problematic on a per se basis. At the micro 
level, the evolution of the EU’s internal rules indicates that consensus achieved within jurisdictions can 
be ephemeral, indicating a need for international rules to preserve room for manoeuvre. 
 
2. Evolution of EU rules 
 
As between the current and previous Commission Regulations75 on the application of the so called 
‘block-exemption’, there has been a tightening of the level of scrutiny over exclusive grantback clauses. 
The previous 2004 Regulation (in common with its predecessor76) distinguished between severable and 
non-severable improvements; terms which conveyed the idea of whether the improvement could, or 
could not, be exploited without infringing upon the licensed technology. Exclusive grantbacks in 
relation to severable improvements were within the category of ‘excluded restrictions’ – those outside 
of the block exemption and requiring individual assessment. In contrast, exclusive grantbacks in relation 
to non-severable improvements were within the block exemption. This was explained by the 
accompanying Commission Guidelines as if there was a self-evident and immutable position here. 
These clauses were ‘not restrictive of competition … since non-severable improvements …[could not] 
be exploited … without the licensor’s permission’.77 It is therefore surprising that the distinction 
between severable and non-severable improvements, as well as any reference to these terms, was 
removed by the current Regulation without explanation in the revised Guidelines.78 Exclusive 
grantbacks in relation to all of the licensee’s improvements are now excluded restrictions requiring 
individual assessment. This amounts to a narrowing of the block exemption and a tightening of the 
control over exclusive grantback clauses. 
 
The rationale for this change sheds light on how new understandings can modify apparently firmly 
established positions. It appears to be provided in a study prepared for the Commission.79 The authors 
consider interactions between the licensor and licensee likely to occur in the absence of a grantback 
clause in relation to a non-severable improvement. They envisage the possibility of bargaining leading 
to ‘an agreement that splits the total surplus to be gained from using the new knowledge between 
licensee and licensor’.80 This would enable the licensee to gain a return even for non-severable 
innovation. This possibility, along with the incentive to innovate, is much diminished in the presence 
of a grantback clause ‘without a properly specified – and enforceable – quid pro quo’. The authors 
therefore call into question the common reasoning, as found in the Commission’s 2004 Guidelines, 
under which ‘the licensor “controls the use of non-severable improvements anyway” so that there is 
                                                          
75 Commission Regulation (EC) No 772/2004 of 27 April 2004 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty 
to categories of technology transfer agreements (2004/L123/11); Commission Regulation (EU) No 316/2014 of 
21 March 2014 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to 
categories of technology transfer agreements (2014/L93/17). 
76 Commission Regulation (EC) No 240/96 of 31 January 1996 on the application of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty 
to certain categories of technology transfer agreements (1996/L31/02). 
77Commission Notice — Guidelines on the application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to technology transfer 
agreements (2004/C 101/02), para 109. 
78 Communication From the Commission - Guidelines on the application of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to technology transfer agreements (2014/C 89/03). 
79 Pierre Regibeau and Katharine Rockett, ‘Assessment of Potential Anticompetitive Conduct in the Field of 
Intellectual Property Rights and Assessment of the Interplay Between Competition Policy and IPR 
Protection’, COMP/2010/16, Nov 2011. 
80 Ibid, p 50. 
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nothing to worry about in such a case’.81 In relation to grantback clauses in general, the authors question 
the strength of the traditional arguments in favour of their use and suggest that the extent of regulation 
here might be ‘too lenient’.82 
 
The absence of stable consensus is a common theme in the academic literature, both at the level of 
individual jurisdictions and as between jurisdictions. Gu detects a pendulum effect at work in the US in 
terms of the intensity of scrutiny of IP rights under antitrust disciplines.83 It is interesting that he 
identifies the high point of this scrutiny with the Department of Justice’s ‘Nine No-No’s’ dating from 
the 1970’s, comprising licensing practices considered to be ‘unlawful in virtually every context’; the 
second of these being to require a licensee to assign back subsequent patents.84 New economic learning 
led to the demise of the ‘Nine No-Nos’ which, in 1981, were renounced as containing ‘more error than 
accuracy’.85 Reichman and Lange write of varying levels of protection available to foreign rights 
holders as between one intellectual property subculture to another when ‘second-comers borrow from 
pre-existing innovations’.86 They consider it unlikely that the Appellate Body would interfere with 
exercises of residual sovereignty ‘except when the end result appears clearly to contradict an express 
provision of the TRIPS Agreement’.87 This is an appropriate threshold for Appellate Body intervention 
bearing in mind the background against which the relevant provisions were developed and now operate. 
The analysis now turns to these provisions.  
 
B. Interpreting the relevant TRIPS provisions 
 
It is argued here that China’s outgoing per se prohibition of grantback clauses under the TIER amounted 
to a TRIPS breach over and above the Article 3.1 national treatment violation. However, it is also argued 
that the threshold for states to show that they have applied something other than a per se approach is a 
low one. The Supreme Court guidance under the Contract Law strongly indicates that this threshold has 
been exceeded, and the regulatory trajectory indicated by the draft Anti-Monopoly Guidelines 
strengthens this impression. 
 






2. Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the provisions of this 
Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right holders or 
the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international 
transfer of technology.  
 
 
                                                          
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid, p 51. 
83 Minkang Gu, ‘Anti-Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights Under The Anti-Monopoly Law: China’s 
Approaches’ 10 Frontiers of Law in China (2015) 488 at 497-499. 
84 Ibid, p 498. This automatic illegality and its substitution with an approach which evaluates the competition 
based effects of grantbacks is similarly referred to in ‘To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of 
Competition and Patent Law and Policy: A Report by the Federal Trade Commission’, October 2003, p 7 and pp 
14-23, available at: https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/promote-innovation-proper-
balance-competition-and-patent-law-and-policy/innovationrpt.pdf (visited 9 January 2020). 
85Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr., ‘Current Antitrust Division Views on Patent Licensing Practices’, 50 Antitrust Law 
Journal (1981) 515, at pp 517-24, cited in the FTC Report ibid, at p 22. 
86 Jerome H. Reichman and David Lange, ‘Bargaining around the TRIPS Agreement: The Case for Ongoing 
Public-Private Initiatives to Facilitate Worldwide Intellectual Property Transactions’, 9 Duke Journal of 
Comparative and International Law (1998) 11 at p 21. 




SECTION 8:  CONTROL OF ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES  





1. Members agree that some licensing practices or conditions pertaining to intellectual property 
rights which restrain competition may have adverse effects on trade and may impede the transfer 
and dissemination of technology. 
 
2. Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent Members from specifying in their legislation 
licensing practices or conditions that may in particular cases constitute an abuse of intellectual 
property rights having an adverse effect on competition in the relevant market.  As provided 
above, a Member may adopt, consistently with the other provisions of this Agreement, 
appropriate measures to prevent or control such practices, which may include for example 
exclusive grantback conditions, conditions preventing challenges to validity and coercive 




1. Is government intervention required or merely permitted? 
 
These provisions clearly do not require complete freedom of contract in technology licensing. On the 
contrary, regulatory intervention to address anti-competitive practices is, at the very least, permitted or, 
in the language of Article 8.2, ‘may be needed’. The UNCTAD Resource Book on TRIPS goes further 
than this to argue that states are required to act against anti-competitive practices.88 This position is 
based in part on a comparison between the language in Articles 8.2 and 40.1. According to the Resource 
Book, the ‘may be needed’ language in Article 8.2 leaves members with discretion over whether or not 
to act. In contrast, the agreement of members referred to in Article 40.1 to the effect that there exist 
certain problematic and unacceptable licensing conditions, is taken to indicate that regulatory 
intervention is required.  
 
It is difficult to agree with this position. What members have agreed on under Article 40.1 is of an 
extremely limited nature – no more than a recognition of possible tension between intellectual property 
rights and competition in the field of technology licensing. There is no agreement even on which 
licensing practices should be addressed. As stated in Article 40.2, this is left to ‘the relevant laws and 
regulations’ of individual members. As covered above, regulatory approaches vary as between different 
groups of states and evolve over time. The ‘may adopt’ language in Article 40.2 also reflects the ‘may 
be needed’ language in Article 8.2 indicating no more than that regulatory intervention is permitted. 
Institutional capacity is also relevant here. It is difficult to accept that states with weak capacity, which 
have not embarked upon the task of regulating potentially anti-competitive practices in technology 
licensing, are in breach of the TRIPS. Moreover, the question may be of limited practical importance. 
A challenge to the absence of national regulation in WTO dispute settlement seems remote. This would 
involve a complainant state taking up the cause of licensees in other states, who are insufficiently 
protected by their national legislation from the market power of licensors from the complainant state. 
As the complaints against China demonstrate, the focus is more on the presence of regulation, which 
may be discriminatory, and is perceived to overly interfere with contractual freedom.  
 
2. Are per se prohibitions permitted? 
 
The next question is therefore the extent to which the TRIPS imposes limitations on states which choose 
to regulate in this area. Article 40.2 is the most relevant provision here.  
                                                          




As noted above,89 the draft text preferred by developing countries referred to members being able to 
specify licensing conditions that may be deemed to be unacceptable on a per se basis. This high level 
of discretion has been reduced by the use of the phrase ‘in particular cases’ which suggests that 
individual assessment of potentially problematic licensing conditions on a case by case basis is always 
required. There are possible textual arguments to the effect that this amounts to a misreading of the 
phrase ‘in particular cases’. As will be explained however, these arguments must be rejected on the 
basis that they reduce the phrase to a tautology, thereby rendering it redundant and inutile.90 
 
The phrase ‘in particular cases’ could be interpreted as referring not to individual instances of the use 
of a licensing condition, but rather to the particular cases non-exhaustively exemplified in the second 
sentence of Article 40.2. This is not entirely far-fetched as the meaning given to a phrase in Article 40.2 
first sentence is informed by the immediate context provided by the second sentence. Also, this would 
result in a different meaning to that preferred by developing countries and rejected by developed 
countries. The provision would be compatible both with a per se approach, and with individual 
assessment rather than only expressly authorizing a per se approach. However, this very same overall 
meaning could have been achieved by omitting the phrase ‘in particular cases’. Therefore, if the phrase 
is interpreted as something other than a tautology,91 it cannot be read as referring to the non-exhaustive 
examples in the second sentence. This is confirmed by the identification of these examples as ‘practices’ 
in the second sentence, corresponding, therefore, with ‘practices or conditions’, rather than ‘particular 
cases’ in the first sentence. 
 
A further textual argument must be rejected on the same basis. The phrase ‘in particular cases’ might 
be read as referring to anything from one individual case of the use of a grantback clause to all such 
cases. In support of this interpretation, it could be argued that the alternative phrase ‘in a particular case’ 
could have been used to more strongly signal that individual assessment is always required. Moreover, 
the second sentence uses the phrase ‘prevent or control’; the term ‘prevent’ arguably indicating per se 
prohibition. On this interpretation, Article 40.2 would be compatible with both a per se approach and 
individual assessment. Again, however, this would be the meaning of the provision without the phrase 
‘in particular cases’, so that accepting this interpretation would reduce it to a tautology. 
 
3. What rigour and depth of individual assessment is required? 
 
It must therefore be accepted that Article 40.2 mandates individual assessment on a case by case basis. 
The question then pertains to what is required by way of the rigour and depth of the assessment. It is 
submitted that there are compelling reasons for maintaining a high degree of flexibility for members. 
For a number of reasons, demonstrating that something other than a per se approach has been applied 
should not be onerous. 
 
First, a different interpretation would call into question the TRIPS compatibility of highly developed 
regulatory systems such as that maintained by the EU. If TRIPS Article 40.2 did not permit the 
regulation of certain practices and conditions with reference to a pre-established and firm rule, under 
                                                          
89 See Section V(A)(1) . 
90 WTO Members have extensively raised redundancy and inutility arguments. It is more common for these 
arguments to be raised across different provisions, sometimes within different agreements, than within the same 
provision. For an example of the latter, see Appellate Body Report, China – Measures Related to the 
Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten and Molybdenum, WT/DS431,432,433/AB/R adopted 29 August 2014, 
para. 2.225. The arguments usually fail on the basis that harmonious interpretation is possible. For an example 
of a successful argument to the effect that certain provisions within the Agreement on Agriculture cannot be 
read so as to render inutile provisions of the GATT, see Appellate Body Report, Indonesia – Importation of 
Horticultural Products, Animals and Animal Products, WT/DS477/AB/R adopted 22 November 2017, para 17.   
91 The UNCTAD Resource Book (above n 73, p 559) also refers to the phrase ‘in particular cases’ as a 
tautology. However, this is in connection with the different point that abusive conditions necessarily and self-
evidently occur only in individual cases. 
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which the competition based effects have been determined ex ante, the hardcore restrictions92 in the 
EU’s technology transfer Regulation might not be permissible. In common with China’s draft Anti-
Monopoly Guidelines,93 the first of these hardcore restrictions covers ‘the restriction of a party’s ability 
to determine its prices …’.94 While China’s Guidelines presently go no further than setting out this 
prohibition (a purely per se approach), the EU Commission Guidelines provide the impression of a 
reasonably definite position, subject to possible limited exceptions.95 It would be excessive to require 
this level of nuance under TRIPS Article 40.2. The Appellate Body should take into account institutional 
capacity and the level of regulatory experience. It is not realistic to expect members in general to 
introduce regulatory systems which, from the outset, approximate the level of sophistication of systems 
which are the product of decades of development and refinement. This is especially so bearing in mind 
that significant divergences can be found between these systems.96 
 
Within the principles of treaty interpretation, the national law and practice relating to the control of anti-
competitive licensing practices is potentially relevant under VCLT Article 32 as Supplementary Means 
of Interpretation. A potential barrier here may be that Article 32 refers to ‘supplementary means of 
interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion’. It 
can be argued that the expressly identified supplementary means are directly referable to the treaty 
itself, unlike the national law at issue here which may well have a much less direct connection with the 
TRIPS – it may pre-date the TRIPS or may have been amended or enacted without TRIPS having been 
directly in mind. It is submitted, however, that even such national law and practice should be admitted 
as supplementary means under Article 32. This is because TRIPS Article 40.2 itself refers to national 
law and regulation. It is therefore entirely natural that this experience should inform the meaning of the 
provision. The further limitation relates to the circumstances in which recourse may be had to 
supplementary means. One possibility here is where ‘the interpretation according to article 31, [l]eaves 
the meaning ambiguous or obscure’. Article 40.2 is at the very least ambiguous on the rigour and depth 
of the required individual assessments. Recourse to national law and practice as supplementary means 
here is extremely helpful. It will reveal divergent positions on exactly which licensing practices are the 
most problematic and how they should be regulated.  
 
The provision cannot, therefore, be interpreted as requiring any particular depth and rigour of 
assessment. However, state discretion here also cannot be completely unbounded. It must be exercised 
in accordance with the consistency requirement within Article 40.2. 
 
 
4. The Article 40.2 consistency requirement 
 
Article 40.2 requires that all measures must be consistent ‘with the other provisions of this Agreement’. 
This requirement can be understood in two senses. Most obviously in the context of this article, other 
provisions such as the Article 3.1 national treatment obligation must be met. Before commenting on 
this, it is notable that the UNCTAD Resource Book views the consistency requirement in the more 
abstract light of ensuring that competition rules are not extended and applied in such a manner as to 
interfere with the normal protection of intellectual property rights.97 A high threshold for determining 
that members have departed from this standard is suggested: ‘It is … the systematic development of 
                                                          
92 The Commission Guidelines (above, n 78) clarify that hardcore restrictions result in the entire agreement 
falling outside of the block exemption without the possibility of severing the restriction from the rest of the 
agreement (para 95). 
93 Guidelines (above, n 20) Chapter 2.  
94 Commission Regulation (EU) No 316/2014 of 21 March 2014 on the application of Article 101(3) of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of technology transfer agreements 
(2014/L93/17), Article 4(1)(a). 
95 Commission Guidelines (above, n 78) paras 18, 94, 99 and 102. 
96 The UNCTAD Resource Book (above, n 73) contrasts the treatment of no-challenge clauses in the US and 
Germany before remarking that, ‘even  the clauses listed as examples by the second sentence of Article 40.2 are 
not necessarily good examples of bad clauses’ (pp 559-560). 
97 Ibid, p 543. 
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national competition law as a general curtailment of intellectual property protection (as required by 
TRIPS) that the consistency requirement is intended to prevent.’98 The Resource Book does not 
comment on the justiciability of this meaning, or on how it should be operationalized in practice. It can 
be suggested that there is a role for panels and the Appellate Body here when they encounter per se 
prohibitions without any accompanying explanation of the gravity of the competition based concerns. 
Without such explanation, there might be insufficient evidence that consideration has been given to 
locating the balance between sometimes conflicting interests and values. This would merely be a check 
for a clearly expressed regulatory rationale, rather than a review of exactly where the balance has been 
located. The lack of need for a more rigorous review is suggested by the first meaning ascribed to the 
consistency requirement above. 
 
Consistency in the sense of compliance with the Article 3.1 national treatment requirement is among 
the control mechanisms at work in this area, which mean that strong oversight via dispute settlement is 
not required. The need to remove discrimination focuses the collective regulatory mind. The question 
is no longer about the treatment to be accorded overwhelmingly to non-national right holders, but rather 
about the treatment to be accorded to right holders in general. It is possible to downplay the moderating 
influence of the national treatment obligation. Take a state in which the volume and value of technology 
licensing is strongly weighted towards transfers from outside. Such a state could have a non-
discriminatory technology licensing regime which is favourable for licensees, without this significantly 
impacting domestic licensors other than in the low volume and value of internal transfers. However, a 
second control mechanism, which is market based, would operate here. Technology licensing may 
simply not occur to an acceptable level if the regulation is not sufficiently balanced as between the 
interests of licensors and licensees.99 
 
The combination of these control mechanisms suggests a limited role for judicial oversight beyond 
checking for discrimination under the first mechanism. The outright prohibition of grantback clauses in 
the TIER, without any accompanying explanation, would probably have amounted to a breach Article 
40.2. However, had China been minded (and if other WTO Members are minded) to maintain a very 
strict approach towards grantbacks, it is suggested that this breach could have been removed by enacting 
an explanation of the competition based rationale for this approach. Individual assessment to satisfy 
Article 40.2 would then occur on a quasi-automatic basis with reference to the enacted explanation, 
rather than involve a detailed assessment.100 The individual assessment here need be no more than a 
statement to confirm that the condition or practice is prohibited. This may seem like a recommendation 
for permitting a rather blunt approach. However, the message, in particular to developing countries with 
limited institutional capacity, is that members are permitted (so far as the TRIPS is concerned) to 
embark upon regulating anti-competitive practices in such a manner. As seen above,101 there is strong 
evidence from Article 8 of the draft Anti-Monopoly Guidelines that China is moving towards a more 
nuanced approach – something that can also be expected of other states. It is clear that application of 
the criteria referred to in Article 8 would satisfy the limited threshold for individual assessment in 
                                                          
98 Ibid, p 552. 
99 It has been reported that the repeal of the TIER provisions was connected as much with increasing the transfer 
of technology from US and EU firms, as it was with ensuring compliance with the TRIPS. In particular, the 
TIER restrictions are reported to have resulted in deals being, ‘abandoned when a Chinese company was 
unwilling to pay the increased costs associated with a foreign company automatically having to issue full 
indemnity, as well as giving up marketing and improvement rights’. ‘Tempered TIER Tantalises US-China 
Trade War Thaw’, Financier World, August 2019 https://www.financierworldwide.com/tempered-tier-
tantalises-us-china-trade-war-thaw#.XW1LdPBKjIV (visited 9 January 2020). 
100 On this point, the main text in Gervais’ work (above n 74) insists that, ‘a priori determination … leading to 
the automatic imposition of a remedial measure’ is excluded (p 554). However, the accompanying note 
provides: ‘Of course if a particular behaviour infringes a well-established principle, the determination is almost 
automatic, but the wording of the Agreement requires a determination that a particular practice is anti-
competitive’. Drawing from accounts of the negotiating history, the UNCTAD Resource Book (above n 73)  
notes that, ‘the industrialized countries conceded that, upon a circumstantial assessment of the effects of a 
licensing stipulation on competition, illegality may be found in individual cases’ (p 545). 
101 Section II. 
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TRIPS Article 40(2), even though it will likely to be some time until this system resembles the level of 
sophistication found in the EU. The same can be said of the criteria currently found in Article 329 of 




This article has considered the application of TRIPS disciplines to the regulation of technology transfer 
contracts. Particular attention has been given to grantback clauses which speak to the ownership of 
improvements to licensed technology made by licensees. China’s regulation has long been criticized by 
its major trading partners as overly constraining contractual freedom to reach negotiated outcomes on 
the rewards and risks in this area. Using the theme of high and low consensus norms, clear conclusions 
can be offered.  
 
The level and limitations of contractual freedom in technology licensing is subject to one high consensus 
norm under the TRIPS, being the prohibition on discrimination. Non-national right holders must be 
treated no less favourably than national right holders in relation to government regulation of technology 
licensing. However, over and above this high consensus norm, the TRIPS does not significantly 
constrain state regulation of this area. WTO members are permitted to decide on how best to foster 
innovation and the dissemination of its outcomes by identifying the point at which the exercise of 
intellectual property rights tips over into anti-competitive behaviour. The conspicuous absence of a 
single best answer on the location of this point, means that the relevant TRIPS norms must be interpreted 
so as to preserve flexibility. WTO members may, if they so wish, prohibit licensing conditions such as 
grantback clauses, provided that the competition law rationale for the prohibition is articulated and 
explained. To the extent that this is viewed by some states as the wrong approach, the question becomes 
whether the failure of historical negotiations should be lamented, and whether further effort should be 
devoted to developing different and better international rules. China’s regulatory trajectory indicates 
otherwise. Going forward, its non-discriminatory regime does not seek to extend and replicate the 
prohibition on grantback clauses previously encountered overwhelmingly by non-nationals. At the very 
least, non-discriminatory regulation can be viewed as genuinely reflecting the position of the regulating 
state on the intellectual property / competition law interface, even if viewed as sub-optimal by other 
states.      
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